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ON THE IDEA OF OWNING IDEAS: APPLYING 




The concept of property has a long tradition and it is widely accepted as a regula -
tion scheme to allocate tangible scarce resources. Supporters of intellectual property  
rights tend to base their argumentation on traditional property rights theories as  
proposed  by  John  Locke,  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  and  Jean-Jacques  
Rousseau. This presentation focuses on the question, whether Locke‘s labor appro-
priation theory can be applied to non-material goods.
The results show that despite the fact that labor provides a strong connection  
between individuals and resources it widely fails to justify appropriation of non-
material goods. Strong Lockean property rights in ideas must be refuted since they  
would harshly interfere with other civil liberties such as free speech, which Locke  
himself found extremely important. Furthermore, even partial appropriation seems  
problematic, given that private ownership is a precondition for efficient material  
production but not for the production of intellectual goods.
Since intellectual production is a social endeavor and creation ex nihilo is im-
plausible intellectual laborers may only (partly) appropriate the fruits of their labor  
but not the entire value of their final produce.
• Locke argues that individuals are entitled to exclusively possess a resource  
to secure the production process. Given that intellectual production does  
not depend on exclusive ownership, intellectual resources remain in the  
public domain.
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• It is only justified to appropriate the fruits of one’s own labor, not those of  
others. This finding seems to be particularly controversial, given the pre-
valent practice of companies seizing the ideas of their employees.
• Appropriation of ideas must not hinder other people to appropriate their  
own share.  Furthermore,  this  pool  of  intellectual  goods must be  bigger  
than the pool, which people could expect in a natural state, in which an in-
tellectual property regime is absent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
When we think of property we usually refer to material things that we ex-
clusively possess,  such as tools,  houses or land.  The legitimate owner of 
such goods is entitled to a number of exclusive rights (or privileges) defined 
and protected by the local sovereignty. These include the right to exclus-
ively possess, use, benefit, sell, consume and destroy the goods in posses-
sion (Honoré 1987). The concept of property has a long tradition and it is 
widely accepted as a regulation scheme to allocate tangible scarce resources. 
In recent years, the same notion of property is being increasingly applied to 
non-material  goods as  well.  Contemporary property rights allow private 
parties and companies to own a great part of contemporary cultural expres-
sion, including literary, musical and artistic works, films, choreography, ar-
chitecture, design, and advertisements. Furthermore, it has become possible 
to  possess  technical  drawings,  computer  algorithms,  circuit  layouts  and 
databases,  geographical  indications,  maps,  medical  treatment procedures, 
business models, and even colors, sounds (e.g. the sound of a Harley David-
son engine), smells, DNA sequences and life forms (e.g. a genetically modi-
fied mouse). Arguments in favor of extending property rights to non-mater-
ial goods tend to be based on traditional property theories.  In particular, 
John Locke‘s labor appropriation theory is frequently cited as an adequate 
philosophical basis in support of strong natural property rights in ideas. Ul-
rich Schatz, director of  the international  division of the European Patent 
Office for example stated that:
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„it would be unfair to the inventor to allow his competitors to exploit the in-
vention which is the fruit of his own substantial intellectual effort and fin-
ancial investment. It is simply unjust to allow people to steal from somebody  
else the result of his creative effort. This is the basic ground of intellectual  
property as a whole (copyright and all the other items of intellectual prop-
erty). It has been unquestioned for several hundreds of years as a basic moral  
principle in our society. (Schatz 1997: 224f)
Other authors draw a similar connection between Lockean justice and 
intellectual property (IP). DeLong (2002) acknowledges “real and significant 
differences” between intangible goods and “plain old property” but insists 
that changing the definition of IP is  sufficient  to bring them in line with 
each  other.  Epstein  (2008)  finds  evidence  of  a  “robust  nature  of  private 
property rights” for land and “all forms of intellectual property”, and calls 
for an end of limits on the terms of private licenses. Hull (2009) and others 
have criticized such moves for widely neglecting the complexity of expand-
ing labor appropriation theory to intellectual goods. To assess whether de-
fenders of Lockean intellectual property rights make a valid claim we shall 
return to the 17th century and re-capture Locke‘s original thought, to which 
we shall stick very closely in order to avoid over simplistic misinterpreta-
tion. In a second step we will then apply his theory to intangible goods. The 
success or failure of this venture shall help us answer the question, whether 
Locke‘s labor appropriation theory can indeed be expanded to the intellec-
tual sphere.
2. JOHN LOCKE‘S LABOR APPROPRIATION THEORY
In the Second Treatise of Government (TG II) (see Locke 1988) Locke identi-
fies property as the most important element of a just civil society, claiming 
it was primarily to protect individual property that the political state was 
created. To overcome the moral problem of private entitlements, Locke does 
not rely on any theory of positive right based on conventions or political de-
cisions.  Instead he argues that the legitimacy of private property derives 
directly  from  the  (God  given)  equality  of  man  in  the  state  of  nature 
(TG II §19) and the property rights in one‘s own body.
Though the earth […] be common to all men, yet every man has a property  
in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of  
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his  body,  and  the  work  of  his  hands,  we  may  say,  are  properly  his.  
(TG II §27)
Locke then goes on saying that even though the fruits of the earth belong 
to humankind in common, it is hard to believe that God gave the earth to 
man without permitting him to take “a kid or a lamb out of the flock, to sat -
isfy his hunger” (TG II §39). Therefore there must be a just way to appropri-
ate natural resources, even without the need to reach consensus among all 
people. Locke believes to have found that solution in the mix of personal 
labor and common land.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and  
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is  
his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from  
the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something  
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour  
being the unquestionable property of the labourer (TG II §27).
Locke‘s  argumentation  is  based  on  the  idea  that  nature  itself  -  until 
labored on - has very little or no practical value for the human kind, and 
that  its  value  is  created  almost  entirely  through  labor.  Comparing  a 
privately owned, farmed land on one side with common land lying idle on 
the other side, he claims that at least ninety percent of the value of the land 
is the effect of labor (TG II §40). The same he believes to be true for water  
taken out of a fountain, for which it should belong to the person that drew it 
out and carried it away (TG II §28).
2.1. PROVISOS: LOCKE‘S SELF-LIMITATION
Locke was aware that granting infinite  property rights may cause severe 
problems and eventually undermines the moral justification of the entire 
property system; hence he tried to adjust for it. Examining his work we find 
at  least  four important  limitations that  constrain  the bold argument that 
everyone  should  be  entitled  to  exclusive  unlimited  property  rights  over 
one’s personal creations. (1) Do not steal. The first restriction is the moral 
imperative not to steal. It derives from the very heart of the property regime 
itself, which holds that an individual must never appropriate fruits of labor 
other than her own. This is because taking from other people as if it were 
mine would mean to deny the other person’s right to enjoy the fruits of her 
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hands. Hence, the deprived individuals would be no more but slaves, leav-
ing them worse off than in the natural state,  where men are born “with  
a title to perfect freedom […] equally with any other man” (TG II §87). (2) 
Spoilage.  The  second  restriction  addresses  the  problem  of  spoilage.  To 
avoid excessive claims, Locke delimits the amount of appropriable property 
by arguing that God gave the world to men for the purpose that the latter 
enjoy it. Therefore an individual may appropriate no more than “any one 
can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils” (TG II §31). Since 
one can only enjoy limited amount of resources, anything “beyond this, is 
more than his  share,  and belongs to others”  (TG II  §31).  (3)  Sufficiency.  
Locke's initial theory assumes that there are enough resources for everyone 
to appropriate a fair share. However, in a world of increasing population 
and limited resources Locke has to account for scarcity. The third proviso 
therefore  states  that  acquisition  is  only  permissible  if  “there  was  still  
enough and as good left in common for others” (TG II §33). Only this way 
he can keep up his position that “he that leaves as much as another can 
make use of, does as good as take nothing at all” (TG II §33). (4) Social con-
cerns. The fourth limitation addresses the social aspect of property. Given 
the social injustice of the time, Locke is aware that a strict property regime 
may cause severe inequality. Particularly old and sick people are often un-
able to fence off and farm their land. Even if every person invested equal 
labor, differences in the fertility of soil may lead to substantially different 
yields. Over time, this natural inequality will increase the gap between rich 
and poor, eventually leading to a point  where the former accumulate so 
much wealth and power that they gain dominion over life and liberty of the 
poor. It is unlikely that people would have agreed in the first place to leave 
the natural state and sign a social contract leading to such consequences. 
Locke makes clear that the powers derived from private property must nev-
er trump civil liberties. In the First Treatise of Government (see Locke 1988) 
he writes:
[N]o Man could ever have a just Power over the Life of another, by Right of  
property in Land or Possessions; since it would always be a sin, in any man  
of estate, to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his  
plenty. […] and a man can no more justly make use of another’s necessity to  
force him to become his vassal (TG I §42)
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In other words, Locke imposes a moral duty of charity. Individuals are ob-
liged not to exploit their weaker brothers and sisters but to provide them 
with everything necessary to survive.
2.2. OVERTURNING MOST LIMITATIONS
Interestingly, as the argument further progresses, three of the four restric-
tions are transcended. The first proviso Locke does not seem to take serious 
at all. (1) As Macpherson (1978) points out in his critical analysis, Locke ap-
parently believes that also “the turfs my servant has cut” (TG II §28, em-
phasis added) can become his (Locke’s) property. This suggests that despite 
Locke’s claim that people must not appropriate the fruits of other people’s 
labor, he does not seem to be willing to walk his talk. (2) The spoilage re-
striction  ceases  with  the  introduction  of  money.  Locke  notes  that  while 
plums may easily rot in a week, nuts can last good for a year and shells, dia-
monds and gold last forever. Therefore a laborer „might heap up as much 
of these durable things as he pleased” (TG II §46). (3) Finally, the third re-
striction concerning sufficiency ceases because, according to Locke, a person 
that appropriates land by laboring on it does not lessen the common stock 
of humankind but actually increases the amount of goods available to all. 
Locke argues that private land is used in a vastly more efficient way than 
land held in common, at one point stating a productivity ratio of one to near 
a hundred (TG II §37). Therefore, a person can appropriate more than her 
share,  if  the additional  goods derived from this  expanded property out-
weigh the fruits from otherwise unproductive land, which Locke likely be-
lieves to be the case.1 In other words, Locke claims that due to productivity 
gains based on property rights even the poorest people in society were bet-
ter off compared to a world of natural state.  (4) At the end only the so-
cial-humanistic proviso remains, obliging property holders not to exert their 
wealth against other people’s liberties and to provide basic charity to those 
that would otherwise die.
1 American settlers frequently used this justification when they took away ‘unproductively 
used’ land from the native indigenous population.
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2.3. CRITIQUE
2.3.1. THE CASE AGAINST UNLIMITED PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
RESOURCES
Locke claims unlimited property rights not only in the fruits of one’s labor 
but also in resources, which he believes to be crucial for laborers to secure 
the benefits of their work. This argument is vulnerable given the fact that 
temporary property rights would be equally sufficient to protect the pro-
duction process. Take the example of a fisher who sets out to mix her labor 
with  the  sea.  To  successfully  catch  a  fish  she  depends  on  the  exclusive 
dominion over the used fishing ground. Otherwise, competing fishers could 
interfere with her task, effectively depriving her of the fruits of her labor. 
Therefore, there is a prima facie reason that granting her an exclusive right 
over the resource is justified. However, we may ask, why should she be en-
titled  to  continue  her  exclusive  right  over  the  fishing  ground  after  she 
pulled in her net and returned to the shore? There is no good reason why 
other fishers, swimmers etc. should not be allowed to use the very same re-
source at different times,  if  their  actions do not harm each other’s tasks. 
Therefore, it seems plausible that the resource must fall back to the common 
domain, once it is not necessary anymore for production.
2.3.2. NOT ENOUGH FOR ALL
Another problem with Locke’s argumentation concerns the sufficiency pro-
viso. According to his theory, no acquisition is permissible if there is a lack 
of enough or as good for others. Only if everyone’s needs are met, people  
may justly acquire a larger share. Given limited resources and excessive in-
dividual claims, clearly this condition is not met in the real world. There 
may have been sufficient resources during the time of Locke’s publication 
but this certainly does not accord with today’s world.2 To meet Locke’s pro-
viso the extent of appropriation would have to be reduced to a level that 
really allows everyone to acquire an equal share. Above all it is doubtful 
that  certain groups of individuals  (e.g. sweat  shop workers)  in  countries 
2 It was certainly true for the fifty million mostly European migrants that settled the Americ-
an continent around the time when Locke formulated his theory. Even if we imagine that 
the settlers granted Native Americans large parts of the territories, there would have been 
still  more than enough unpopulated land that could be justly appropriated in line with 
Locke‘s thought.
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with generally rich resources but highly unequal wealth distributions are 
really better off than in a natural state.
2.3.3. COMMON ALTERNATIVE
Finally, Locke can be criticized on the basis that his theory omits other pos-
sibilities to regulate resources. It might be more conducive to both society 
and each member of society to refrain from privatization and keep certain 
resources in the common domain. Locke claims that individuals of the nat-
ural state agreed on their free will to bind themselves to a social contract 
that forms the basis for civil society. If this is true, why should individuals 
not be able to also agree on their free will to manage resources in common? 
Societies form common armies to defend their territories and they create in-
stitutions  like  police  forces  and courts  to  advance  living  conditions  and 
justice. Is there a reason why people could not join forces to for example 
also build a common fleet to make better use of the sea and prevent over-
fishing? Locke himself seems to be uncertain whether all resources should 
be privately owned. While he generally dismisses restrictions in appropriat-
ing resources he does believe “the water running in the fountain” to be in 
the common domain (TG II §29). It is difficult to see, where Locke draws the 
line between private and common property.
3. APPLYING LABOR APPROPRIATION THEORY TO NON-
MATERIAL GOODS
Given a natural right to the produce of ones own labor, supporters of Lock-
ean intellectual property rights argue that no difference should be made re-
garding its material or non-material form. Moore (2004) rightly points out 
that also intangible goods are fruits of labor. Who would doubt that know-
ledge production takes up substantial energy and considerable amount of 
financial resources? If we accept Locke’s idea that each person has a prop-
erty in her own including the labor of her body, and if we further accept  
that intellectual goods are the result of (intellectual) labor – just like pota-
toes are the result of (mostly) physical labor – then a person must also be 
entitled to appropriate the result of mental work. Even more so this must be 
true as the intellectual laborer takes absolutely nothing from the commons 
but leaves the resources in place, for that others can equally make use of 
them to create their own private goods. If so, then how could anyone doubt 
that “intellectual property is indeed […] the most basic form of property be-
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cause a man uses nothing to produce it other than his mind” (Bainbridge 
2006: 17)?
3.1 CRITIQUE OF STRONG PROPERTY RIGHTS IN IDEAS
Despite  this  rather  intuitive  argument one may respond that  intellectual 
goods are substantially different from material goods, making it difficult to 
expand Locke’s natural rights justification to ideas. Indeed, even supporters 
of strong intellectual property rights generally agree that intellectual goods 
cannot be owned in the full liberal sense, as this would seriously harm ma-
jor principles of an open and liberal society. A strong intellectual property 
regime would allow creators of intellectual goods to exert full control over 
the use of their creations, even after they share them with others. A scientist 
for example could decide, who should and who should not be allowed to 
access her findings, an author could demand that her books be read only in 
a specific location and no copies to be sold at second hand markets, and a 
politician could prevent selected journalists from publishing critical articles 
about her  ideas.  Apparently,  such  system of strong intellectual  property 
rights would strongly interfere with other civil liberties, most prominently 
free speech,  which Locke himself  found extremely important.  Zemer has 
been pointed out that Locke was “aware of the dilemmas and tensions in-
herent in any regime securing rights in authorial commodities”, particularly 
regarding its social and economic impact on the community (2005: 898). In a 
1694 letter entitled Liberty of the Press, which criticizes the Licensing Act of 
1662, he explicitly calls for limited authors’ rights to ensure the successful 
creation of complex ideas (see Locke 1997).3 It would be absurd to ignore 
these facts and try to turn Locke’s property theory against his own believes.
3.2. IS IP NECESSARY FOR LIFE?
Locke’s most convincing argument in favor of property rights is self-preser-
vation (TG II §25). It is doubtful that a lack of property rights in intellectual 
goods would equally lead to an extinction of men. Unlike water and food, 
intellectual  goods are not immediately necessary to survive. Even if  they 
were, this would have to apply equally to all people. On the other hand, if  
we assume that access to certain ideas was immediately necessary to sur-
3 The law titled „Act for preventing abuses in printing seditious, treasonable and unlicensed 
books and pamphlets, and for regulating of printing and printing-presses” entered force on 
June 10, 1662. For further information see Astbury (1978).
282 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 5:2
vive, we must ask, how could it be justified that such lifesaving intellectual 
good be assigned to a single owner? Imagine, humankind experiencing a 
serious plague, be it HIV or cancer, and a remedy were available for cure. 
Would it be acceptable to assign this knowledge to a single individual or 
company, given that the owner of this knowledge could rightfully decide 
not to share it with the world but to provide it only to a limited number of 
(e.g. wealthy) people, even if the very same knowledge could be used to 
cure everybody at no additional cost?4 As noted above, Locke believed that 
it was immoral to let others die (TG II §42) and that one must give way to 
„those who are in danger to perish without it” (TG II §183). Again it would 
be  doubtful  that  individuals  deliberately  signed a  social  contract,  which 
states that property rights trump human lives. Therefore, strong property 
rights in lifesaving intellectual goods are not morally justified on Lockean 
grounds, putting into question the right of patent holders to restrict the pro-
duction and dissemination of lifesaving generic drugs. But what about other 
intellectual  resources?  Do  Lockean  arguments  support  appropriation  of 
non-lifesaving intellectual goods?
3.3. IS IP NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION?
Apart from the argument of self-preservation, Locke claims that appropri-
ation of land is justified because it is a necessary precondition for produc-
tion. This seems intuitively correct when there is a resource rich enough to 
satisfy the needs of everyone. In a world of plentiful water it is plausible to 
reason that someone gets to own a pitcher  of water by carrying it  away 
from the river. First, because water is a necessity for living, and if everyone 
needed the consent of everyone else to appropriate even a negligible share, 
humanity would die out of thirst; second, because the river remains in the 
common domain, which leaves everyone else the chance to fetch as much 
water as they please themselves. All this does not apply to non-rival intel-
4 In 2003 the Patent Office in Chennai (formerly Madras), India granted provisional exclusive 
marketing rights (EMR) for the commercialization of the cancer drug „Imatinib Mesylate“ 
(Glivec®) to Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis. As a result the production of generic 
equivalents in India (at the price of one-tenth of Glivec®) had to be stopped and thousands 
of patients lost access to an affordable drug that delays the advancement of leukemia. After  
heavy protests from cancer patients and human rights groups Chennai Patent Office finally 
denied protection. The decision was later confirmed by a Chennai High Court ruling. No-
vartis claimed that Indian Patent law violated WTO patent guidelines but finally dropped 
its plan to appeal the decision, due to growing international pressure. For more information 
on the case see http://2009.publiceye.ch/cm_data/Novartis_e.pdf. For a discussion on the in-
terdependence  of  intellectual  property  rights  and  international  trade  negotiations  see 
Drahos (2004).
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lectual goods. Unlike material resources, intellectual goods can be used by 
an infinite number of persons simultaneously without being used up. Shif-
frin (2001) and many others point out that the use of intellectual goods does 
not depend on the exclusive right of disposal over the resource (see Romer 
1990). An intellectual good is not an immaterial bucket of water that has to 
be fenced off against others. It rather resembles a resource itself, similar to a 
lake or an ocean of intellectual goods, which provides humankind with the 
intangible resources for further production. Restricting access to these re-
sources likely contradicts Locke’s proviso that “[t]he labourer does not let 
what he has appropriated go to waste” (TG II §37). Imagine a person or a 
company that enjoys exclusive rights to control an intellectual good, be it a 
new scientific finding, a piece of source code or a recipe. Intellectual prop-
erty rights enable the owner to prevent others from using the idea as well. 
This leaves everyone else but the owner worse off and diminishes the full 
potential of the intellectual resource for value creation, particularly when 
the owner limits the production or dissemination of tangible goods based 
her protected idea. Take the example of a pharmaceutical company that can 
force other companies to shut down their independent production of simil-
ar generic drugs, even though plurality in the market would stir further re-
search and help produce better medication in the future. Similarly, a car-
maker has no economic interest in supporting technologies that potentially 
rival its existing but less competitive technologies. These limitations associ-
ated with monopolies diminish the potential use of intellectual resources, a 
problem that may be of greater concern than in the case of tangible goods 
(Benkler 2000).
Locke seems to be aware of the problem when he writes that individuals 
shall not rightfully own land in case they do not productively use it. Indeed, 
productivity  seems  to  be  one  of  Locke’s  main  arguments  why  people 
should own land in the first place. Accordingly, an individual must lose her 
exclusive  right  towards unused immaterial  goods.  Whether  Locke’s  pro-
ductivity argument also applies to ideas depends on the effect on produc-
tion. If private appropriation of an intellectual good leads to an increase of 
its practical value for the community it is likely justified. If it reduces the 
practical value then it likely infringes Locke’s waste proviso and lacks justi-
fication. The literature is divided on this issue, some authors arguing that 
waste rarely occurs (see e.g. Hughes 1988), while others claim that waste al-
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ways occurs (see e.g. Hettinger 1989). We may add that this question can 
only be answered empirically case by case.
3.4. INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES, A LOCKEAN PRIVATE 
GOOD?
Another aspect of intellectual property concerns the conditions of its appro-
priation. Locke believes that by mixing one’s physical labor with a resource, 
one acquires a natural right not only to the crops produced but also to the 
land itself. Assuming Locke is right and the act of picking an apple is suffi-
cient to take possession of it, it is still the case that the apple tree must be in 
my possession or in the public domain. If I pick an apple from my neigh-
bor’s tree I cannot claim it, let alone the entire tree, no matter how much ef-
fort I put into it. In the case of intellectual goods it is very similar. One could 
argue that the act of absorbing knowledge in the sense of a repetitive task of 
memorization and analytical thinking is enough to claim an idea. However, 
this is only the case if the original resource the idea derived from is in the 
common domain. This leads to a major theoretical problem. Given that all 
ideas are the result of human thought, and further given Locke’s claim that 
property rights do not expire, there are no intellectual resources that can be 
appropriated.5 How could anyone appropriate intellectual goods if they are 
already owned by their creators? A way out could be to depart from Locke’s 
thought – as laid down in the Second Treatise of Government and delimit 
property rights to a certain period of time, after which they are released into 
the public domain, for that intellectual laborers can freely benefit from past 
ideas after the legal protection expires.6 The idea is prominently applied in 
most intellectual property laws today.
5 Locke believes that property rights should last forever, effectively extending beyond the 
proprietor’s death. According to his thought property can be passed on to children and 
grand children or to any other beneficiary any time.
6 Locke briefly addresses intellectual property when he opposes the Licensing Act of 1662. 
Again in the letter Freedom of the Press, he does not draw on natural property rights in 
ideas when he notes that „nobody should have any peculiar right in any book which has  
been in print fifty years, but any one as well as another might have the liberty to print it, for 
by such titles as these, which lie dormant, and hinder others, many good books come quite 
to  be  lost.  [… N]or  can  there  be  any  reason  in  nature  why I  might  not  print  [classic  
books…], if I thought fit. This liberty, to any one, of printing them, is certainly the way to  
have them the cheaper and the better.” This suggests that Locke proposed a limited term to  
copyright of 50 years. (see Locke 1997)
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3.5. INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTION EX NIHILO?
Proponents of Lockean intellectual property rights hold that it is not the ap-
propriation of external  intellectual  goods they try to justify  but  self-pro-
duced ideas, possibly without input from others. This view of solipsistic in-
tellectual production is based on the assumption that ideas can be produced 
independently of external influences, solely using one’s own mind. How-
ever, the idea that ideas could be produced ex nihilo out of thin air is vul-
nerable. Studying the process of intellectual production we find that an in-
tellectual good is generally not the product of a single genius but a highly 
cooperative task. Isaac Newton famously acknowledged the debt to his pre-
cursors, when writing to his (short and hunchbacked) rival Robert Hooke: 
“If  I  have seen further it  is  by standing on ye shoulders of Giants”  (see  
Westfall 1981). The production of ideas is a multifaceted creative cultural 
process ranging across space and time. Knowledge is passed on from gener-
ation to generation and continuously develops over time. Modern innova-
tion theory shows that ideas tend to be generated in the course of interac-
tion in creative milieu (see e.g. Camagni 1991). Innovations are generally 
embedded in a social context (Polanyi 1977). While there is no need to di-
minish the share of each individual laborer,  it  still  holds that intellectual 
production would be impossible or at least greatly hampered, if it were not 
supported by other. However then, if any intellectual idea is “an outcome of 
joint efforts of many individuals from different generations […] then how 
much justified is it to grant an exclusive right over its uses only to its latest  
contributor in complete disregard to the legitimate rights of the earlier con-
tributors?” (Singh 2002: 70) It may be difficult to measure the precise value 
of each addition to pre-existing ideas. Nonetheless, a person that makes a 
small modification to help produce a great value should not receive more 
credit for her labor than the last person needed to lift a car should receive 
credit for hers (Hettinger 1989). The effort of the last contributor does not 
equal the value of the entire product, for which she has a natural right only 
to appropriate her individual share.
4. CONCLUSION: LIMITED PROPERTY RIGHTS IN IDEAS
The investigation shows that it is rather difficult to extend Locke’s labor ap-
propriation theory to non-material goods. (1) Clearly Locke’s theory does 
not justify strong property rights in ideas, since unlimited exclusive owner-
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ship in ideas would seriously restrict other civil liberties such as free speech, 
which even strong supporters of natural property rights are unwilling to ac-
cept. However, even when we apply a weaker notion of property rights, 
these would have to be limited in many ways. (2) Locke believes private 
ownership  to  be  a  precondition  for  efficient  production.  While  this  is 
already contentious for material goods, it is implausible for the intellectual 
sphere, since exclusive ownership is not necessary to make productive use 
of an idea. As a result intellectual laborers may only appropriate the fruits 
of their labor but refrain from appropriating the resource itself. The latter 
could only be exclusively owned if it was necessary for production, which is 
not the case in the intellectual sphere. (3) Given that intellectual production 
is a social endeavor and creation ex nihilo is implausible, individual authors 
have a natural right to appropriate only the personal share they added but 
not the value of the entire intellectual  produce. (4) People or institutions 
must not deprive others of the fruits of their labor. This finding seems to be 
particularly controversial, given the prevalent practice of companies to seize 
the ideas of their employees. (5) Appropriation of ideas must not hinder 
others from appropriating their own share. (6) The appropriation of intellec-
tual resources must leave everyone else better off compared to a society that 
adopts weaker property rights or where intellectual resources remain in the 
common domain. It is not possible to decide a priori whether strong, weak 
or no intellectual property rights lead to optimal results. Such decisions can 
only be made case by case on the basis of empirical research. Without doubt 
there are good reasons to protect certain intellectual goods, while there may 
also be good or even better reasons to leave certain types of intellectual pro-
duce in the public domain.
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